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• The use of non-cooperative game theory with the focus on horizontal inventory in-
teractions among multiple independent newsvendors is reviewed.
• A framework for identifying the different types of horizontal inventory interactions is
developed Different modelling approaches and conditions required for existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium are discussed.
• An up-to-date literature review is provided and important future research directions
are discussed.
1
         
A review of non-cooperative newsvendor games with
horizontal inventory interactions
Lena Silbermayr∗
∗Department of Information Systems and Operations,
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1,1020 Wien, Austria
Abstract
There are numerous applications of game theory in the analysis of supply chains where
multiple actors interact with each other in order to reach their own objectives. In this
paper we review the use of non-cooperative game theory in inventory management within
the newsvendor framework describing a single period inventory control model with the
focus on horizontal interactions among multiple independent newsvendors. We develop a
framework for identifying these types of horizontal interactions including, for example, the
models with the possibility of inventory sharing via transshipments, and situations with
substitutable products sold by multiple newsvendors. Based on this framework, we discuss
and relate the results of prior research and identify future research opportunities.
Keywords: newsvendor; non-cooperative simultaneous game; transshipments; substitution;
horizontal coordination
1. Introduction
The newsvendor model is a single-period inventory problem, where the decision maker
places an inventory order in advance of the selling season before demand is realized. As
demand is not known in advance the amount of stock to be kept becomes a challenging
decision. Excess inventory results in high inventory related costs while shortages results in
low service levels and lost revenues.
Whenever there are multiple newsvendors (retailers) selling same or related products to
customers then any horizontal interaction between the retailers has to be taken into con-
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sideration when making inventory decisions. In practice, several forms and varying degrees
of horizontal interactions can occur. For example, inventory aggregation or risk pooling
through inventory transshipments, enables retailers to pool their demand risks while in-
creasing profits and service levels. That is, a retailer might use the option to transship
excess inventory to a retailer facing a shortage to benefit from reduced leftover inventory.
The transshipment receiving retailer, on the other hand, can benefit from increased sales.
Another possible form of horizontal interaction is product substitution where customers,
in case of a stockout, find a substitute for the product at another retailer.
In many real situations retailers in the same supply chain echelon that interact in such
ways are independent (decentralized) players. They act independently by optimizing their
own objectives. This constitutes a non-cooperative static game where retailers in advance
of the selling season make their decisions simultaneously taking any inventory interaction
into consideration.
Previous works surveying the application of non-cooperative newsvendor games are,
for example, Cachon (2003) who focuses on vertical coordination between supplier and
buyer (newsvendor) or Cachon and Netessine (2006) and Chinchuluun et al. (2008) who
provide tutorials on non-cooperative newsvendor games with horizontal interactions where
two newsvendors compete on product availability. There are also reviews on inventory
transshipments. Paterson et al. (2011) review inventory models with lateral transship-
ments in general, in centralized and decentralized supply chains. Huang (2013) considers
transshipments and substitution between retailers focusing on supply chain relationships
between the manufacturer and the retailers.
This paper fills a gap in the literature by providing a review on quantitative models for
multiple independent newsvendors with any type of horizontal inventory interactions. In
the last years, especially due to new business models and advanced information technologies
several papers dealing with the application of non-cooperative newsvendor games focusing
on several aspects leading to horizontal inventory interactions have appeared. What is still
missing is a structured classification of the different aspects and applications that enable
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horizontal inventory interactions in a supply chain with multiple independent retailers in
order to provide an overview on the main findings in this field and to discuss future research
opportunities.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We describe and classify the specific settings where game theory applications to
horizontal inventory interactions arise.
• We discuss the modelling approaches and conditions required for the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium under each setting.
• We address horizontal coordination and discuss possible coordination mechanisms
that can be applied for horizontal supply chain relationships.
• We provide an up-to-date literature review summarizing the important findings in
that field.
• We identify gaps and discuss important future research directions.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the classi-
cal newsvendor model and the basic concepts of non-cooperative game theory and discuss
possible interactions between decentralized newsvendors that may result in inventory inter-
actions leading to the review structure and methodology used in this paper. In Sections 3
and 4 the different models are analyzed using non-cooperative game theory. In each section
we introduce some basic concepts of the non-cooperative games and then proceed to review
and discuss the related literature in the respective field. Section 5 discusses miscellaneous
aspects with combinations or comparisons of different models discussed in Sections 3 and
4. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses directions for future research.
2. Preliminaries
We first introduce the classical newsvendor model, discuss possible interactions among
multiple decentralized newsvendors in a non-cooperative fashion and provide a brief overview
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on basic game theoretic concepts in this context. Then, the structure of the literature re-
view and the review methodology is presented.
2.1. The classical newsvendor model
Consider a single period inventory model with n retailers i = 1, 2, ..., n. The retailers act
to maximize their own profits. They face random demands Di with marginal distribution
function FDi and demands can be correlated. The product is sold at a selling price ri per
unit and purchased at ci per unit.
In the classical newsvendor setting, if demand of retailer i, Di, turns out to be larger
than the stocking quantity Qi, unsatisfied demand is assumed to be immediately lost and
a penalty cost of pi is incurred per unsatisfied demand. On the other hand, if demand
turns out to be smaller than the stocking quantity, leftovers are salvaged at a value of si
per unit where ri > ci > si. All parameters as well as marginal and joint distributions of
demands are common knowledge.1
In this case, the expected profit of a retailer i is
ΠNVi (Qi) = E(ri min(Di, Qi) + si(Qi −Di)+ − pi(Di −Qi)+ − ciQi), (1)
where we define (X)+ = max(X, 0). The expected profit function is concave and the
optimal order quantity satisfies
FDi(Qi) =
ri − ci + pi
ri − si + pi , (2)
where the right-hand side of (2) is the newsvendor’s critical ratio.
However, there are several settings which cause interaction among the retailers when
there are shortages and leftovers at different retailers. For example, the retailers with
a shortage can procure goods from the retailers with leftovers to satisfy some of their
customer demand, which describes a system with lateral transshipments; or customers
1For games with incomplete informations we refer to e.g. Wu and Parlar (2011).
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whose demand could not be satisfied might search for a retailer with leftover inventory
and make a purchase in this substitute location. Because of these possible interactions,
a newsvendor has to consider the decisions of other newsvendors which gives rise to a
game theoretic approach. The common characteristic of the different settings is that the
unsatisfied demand of one retailer can be satisfied by another retailer. Therefore the risks
related to shortages and leftovers differ from the classical newsvendor setting.
2.2. Basic concepts in non-cooperative game theory
We give a short overview of the basic concepts in non-cooperative static games with
complete information, i.e. all players are in possession of all information in the game. Since
our focus is on single-period newsvendor games, only one-shot games (i.e. games with only
one play-through) are discussed and we will directly link the basic concepts to this setting.
For further details we refer to e.g. Friedman (1990), Cachon and Netessine (2006) and
Chinchuluun et al. (2008).
A game has a set of rational decision makers, called players, denoted by retailer i =
1, ..., n, a set of strategies available to each retailer denoted by stocking quantities Qi, and
payoffs received by each player given by the expected profits Πi. In a non-cooperative
static game the strategies (stocking quantities) are chosen simultaneously and the players
are unable to make binding commitments before choosing their strategies.
The rational outcome of such a game is the Nash equilibrium which is characterized by
solving the system of n best response functions of all players. The best response function
of player i given vector of fixed strategies of the other players, Q−i gives player i’s response
that maximizes its payoff (i.e. Q∗i (Q−i) = maxQi Πi(Qi,Q−i), hence, it is typically defined
by the players’ first order conditions. A Nash equilibrium Q∗i (Q
∗
−i) is considered a stable
outcome as no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy choice.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed when the players’ payoffs Πi are
concave with respect to Qi. The uniqueness of an equilibrium can be proven e.g. through
contraction mapping argument showing that the best response mapping is a contraction,
which then implies that the mapping has a unique fixed point. In other words, one has to
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verify that no column sum or no row sum of the matrix of derivatives of the best response
functions exceeds one (Cachon and Netessine, 2006).
In general decentralized decision making results in supply chain inefficiency, since the
Nash equilibrium usually is not equal to the system optimal solution where a centralized
decision maker maximizes the total payoff of all players.
2.3. Review structure and methodology
We group different settings which give rise to interaction among decentralized newsven-
dors in two categories: 1) designed interaction and 2) customer driven interaction. The
first category includes settings where the newsvendors design operations in such a way that
the supply chain design enables risk pooling via inventory sharing. Lateral transshipments
among retailers (i.e. virtual pooling), and physical centralization of stocks at a central
warehouse (i.e. physical pooling) belong to this first category. Customer driven interac-
tion, on the other hand, stems from the perceived substitutability and complementarity
of different products and/or sellers. If the customers are willing to substitute products
and/or sellers, a shortage at one retailer causes higher demand at other retailers. On the
other hand, if products are complementary, shortage at one retailer hinders sales of another
complementary retailer.
One of the main differences among the two categories is that for the designed interac-
tion there is a necessity to develop horizontal contracts so that the horizontal interaction
through inventory pooling can take place. If the benefits of the designed system are not
appropriately distributed, the players might decide not to participate in the game at all.
Then, their decisions can be properly modelled using the classical newsvendor setting. On
the other hand, the customer driven interaction is an external factor which should not
be ignored. Accordingly, the literature on the first category (designed interaction) puts
some focus on horizontal coordination and contracting while the literature on the second
category (customer driven interaction) does not deal with horizontal contracting.
The structure of our literature review is shown in Table 1. In the case of a designed
interaction through transshipments we explicitly discuss a two-retailer and n > 2 retailer
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problem, since the general model with n > 2 retailers includes an additional complexity
of how to allocate residual stocks to stocked-out retailers. For the physical centralization
example the conclusions are similar, hence, they will not be repeatedly discussed in such a
detail. In the final Section 5 papers dealing with a combination or comparison of designed
and customer driven interactions will be discussed.
Designed interaction Transshipments Two retailers
(Section 3) (Section 3.1) (Section 3.1.1)
n > 2 retailers
(Section 3.1.2)
Physical centralization
(Section 3.2)
Customer driven interaction Substitution
(Section 4) (Section 4.1)
Complementarity
(Section 4.2)
Combination/Comparison of designed
and customer driven interaction
(Section 5)
Table 1: Organization of literature review including section numbers.
The inclusion criteria for this review are articles studying horizontal inventory inter-
actions among multiple decentralized newsvendors that make non-cooperative stocking
decisions. Exclusion criteria applied for this review are articles focusing on purely co-
operative operational decisions and information asymmetries or incomplete information.
Since we put our focus on inventory-related implications of horizontal interactions we also
exclude articles with price competition.
3. Designed interaction
In this section we consider non-cooperative risk pooling games resulting from the sell-
ers designed operations that enable inventory sharing. For independent retailers selling
identical products the most commonly studied setting in this category is the lateral trans-
shipments system which is the focus of Section 3.1. Another possible setting to exploit the
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risk pooling benefit is the physical consolidation of inventories at a central location (see
Section 3.2). The detailed classification of the literature discussed in this section is shown
in Table 3.
3.1. Transshipments
First, we discuss virtual pooling through transshipments, i.e. residual inventory at one
retailer is shipped to another retailer that faces a stockout.
3.1.1. Two retailers
Transshipments from i to j (throughout the paper, when using this indexing, we as-
sume i 6= j) incurs a transshipment cost cij per unit. Since i and j are independent a
transshipment price rij per unit is charged by retailer i and paid by j. If there is still
unsatisfied demand at i after the transshipments are realized, then a shortage penalty cost
of pi is incurred.
We assume that ci < cj + cji, sj > si + cji, and ri + pi < rj + pj + cji. These
conditions guarantee that it is not beneficial to always purchase and/or salvage through
the other retailer, and to sell to the other retailer instead of own customers. To ensure
mutually profitable transshipments we need to assume that the unit transshipment price
rij ∈ [si + cij , rj + pj ], where si + cij < rj + pj (see Rudi et al. (2001); Hu et al. (2007)),
then neither retailer is worse off by performing transshipments. We will call the mutually
beneficial transshipment system as bidirectional setting.
For given order quantities Qi and Qj , transshipments from i to j are Tij = min((Dj −
Qj)
+, (Qi −Di)+). Sales at retailer i are Si = min(Di, Qi) + Tji, leftovers at retailer i are
Li = (Qi −Di − Tij)+, and unsatisfied demand at retailer i is Pi = (Di −Qi − Tji)+.
When the two retailers make their ordering decisions locally, in a decentralized manner,
then the expected profit of retailer i is
Πi(Qi, Qj) = E(riSi + (rij − cij)Tij − ciQi − rjiTji + siLi − piPi). (3)
A special case of the problem where transshipments are only possible in one direction
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has been studied in some recent papers (Seifert et al., 2006; He et al., 2014; Arikan and
Silbermayr, 2018). Under the so-called unidirectional transshipments setting, we assume
that transshipments are only allowed from retailer i to retailer j, i.e. Tji = 0. Unidirec-
tional transshipments can be applicable, for example, in omni-channel systems with online
and oﬄine stores where in-store customers in contrast to online customers are not willing
to wait a regular shipment time for product delivery (Seifert et al., 2006). Other reasons
might be that certain transshipment routes are impossible, due to e.g. high cost, unavail-
able transport or different proximities, limiting inventory pooling (Axsäter, 2003; Smirnov
and Gerchak, 2014, 2016).
Equilibrium analysis
For the bidirectional setting, following Huang et al. (2011), we define Dei = Di + (Dj −
Qj)
+ as the effective demand for retailer i. It includes the initial demand at retailer i
and all the secondary demand, i.e. the unsatisfied demand at other retailers which can
be potentially satisfied by retailer i through transshipment (or substitution discussed in
Section 4.1). Similarly, Dni = Di− (Qj−Dj)+ is the net demand at retailer i, which is the
initial demand minus the part which can be potentially satisfied by retailer j (Arikan and
Silbermayr, 2018). Note that Dei ≥ Di ≥ Dni and, hence, FDei (Qi) ≤ FDi(Qi) ≤ FDni (Qi).
Hu et al. (2007) show that the expected profit under decentralized decision making of
retailer i, Equation (3), is concave in Qi. The first order conditions characterizing the
optimal order quantities Q∗i (Qj) for i = 1, 2 are
(ri − ci + pi)− (rji − rij + cij)FDi(Qi)− (ri − rji + pi)FDni (Qi)
−(rij − cij − si)FDei (Qi) = 0. (4)
The existence of the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by the concavity of the expected
profit functions, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium is shown by a contraction mapping
argument (see e.g. Cachon and Netessine (2006) for further details). The proof follows
along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1 in Rudi et al. (2001) (see also Arikan and
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Silbermayr (2018)). Implicit differentiation of Equation (4) results in
∂Qi
∂Qj
= − (rij − si − cij)gD
e
i
(Qi) + (ri + pi − rji)gDni (Qi)
(ri + pi − si)fDi(Qi) + (rij − si − cij)fDei (Qi) + (ri + pi − rji)fDni (Qi)
. (5)
For Dei , define fDei (Qi)
.
= ∂FDei (Qi)/∂Qi and gDei (Qi)
.
= ∂FDei (Qi)/∂Qj , and similarly
for Dni . From the definitions of the effective demand and the net demand, one can de-
rive FDei (Qi) ≤ FDi(Qi) ≤ FDni (Qi), which leads to fDei (Qi) ≥ gDei (Qi) and fDni (Qi) ≥
gDni (Qi), respectively. Combining these properties, one can conclude that −1 ≤ ∂Qi∂Qj ≤ 0.
That is, the slopes of the best response functions are less than one in absolute terms, which
is sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Cachon and Netessine,
2006).
Note that the analysis regarding existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for
the unidirectional transshipment setting is similar.
Horizontal coordination
In a system with decentralized retailers that maximize their own profits, there are
incentive problems that prevent coordination. However, there is literature that deals with
horizontal coordination discussing mechanisms or contracts that can be designed in order
to reach system optimal solutions in which a single decision maker acts so as to maximize
the total profit of the system. If the ordering decisions are centrally made then there is no
need to charge a transshipment price and the total expected profit is
ΠC(Qi, Qj) = E(
2∑
i=1
(riSi − cijTij − ciQi + siLi − piPi)). (6)
The total expected profit given in Equation (6) is concave (Rudi et al., 2001) and the first
order conditions characterizing the optimal order quantities Q∗Ci for i = 1, 2 are
(ri − ci + pi)− (cij − rj + cji + sj − pj)FDi(Qi)− (ri + pi − cji − sj)FDni (Qi)
−(rj + pj − cij − si)FDei (Qi) = 0. (7)
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As discussed before, players, without coordination, only focus on their own objectives
which leads to an inefficiency in the supply chain (see difference between Equation (4)
and Equation (7)), i.e. they cannot achieve the system optimal solution of a centralized
decision maker. Literature on supply chain coordination seeks to find simple mechanisms
(contracts) that provide incentives for the players to coordinate the decentralized system
and achieve the system optimum.
Rudi et al. (2001) study the simple transshipment price contract discussed above that
from the practical perspective is easy to execute, i.e. a retailer facing a stockout has
to pay a predetermined unit transshipment price in order to receive leftovers from the
other retailer. Rudi et al. (2001) show that the decentralized system can be coordinated
by appropriately set transshipment prices equating Equation (4) and Equation (7) and
solving for the transshipment price rij .
Hu et al. (2007) provide examples which show that such coordinating prices may not
exist in several cases considering a more general model than Rudi et al. (2001) including
uncertain capacity. Especially with increasing asymmetries in the economic parameters
for the two retailers, coordination of bidirectional transshipments may not be possible by
varying the transshipment prices. For example, Arikan and Silbermayr (2018) numerically
show that coordinating transshipment prices might only exist for situations with low de-
mand correlation between the retailers when they differ in their shortage cost. That is,
coordination is only possible in cases where transshipments are very beneficial. A sufficient
condition that coordinating transshipment prices exist is that the retailers are symmetric
(Hu et al., 2007).
Unlike Hu et al. (2007) that assume that retailers subject to uncertain capacity are
supplied by two independent suppliers, Lee and Park (2016) consider a two-retailer trans-
shipment game supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. Hence their model
includes competition for supplier capacity and inventory sharing through transshipments.
They show that retailers increase their orders when capacity is allocated proportional to
the orders (i.e. rationing game) and that coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more
12
         
limited range due to the capacity uncertainty.
Shao et al. (2011) examine transshipment incentives under the transshipment price
contract for a fully decentralized two-echelon supply chain including also the manufacturer’s
decision that distributes the product through two identical retailers. They show that if
the manufacturer has control, it will set a high transshipment price in order to increase its
profit. If, however, the retailers have control they prefer low transshipment prices and as
a result the manufacturer might prefer dealing with centralized retailers.
Feng et al. (2018) consider the same transshipment price contract, but under par-
tial backordering. That is, the transshipment quantity form i to j is Tij = min(δ(Dj −
Qj)
+, (Qi −Di)+), with δ being the fraction of backordered demands. However, they do
not discuss the coordinating transshipment prices under this setting.
Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010) find a coordinating contract with an implicit pric-
ing mechanism where transshipment prices depend on the retailers’ inventory decisions.
Thereby, they split up the contract into two phases. In the first phase inventory dependent
transshipment prices are set and then in a second phase - after deciding on inventories but
before demand realization - the negotiated transshipment prices are fixed. The contract
has the desirable property of flexibility as it allows to arbitrarily divide the total expected
profit between the two retailers depending on the bargaining power of the retailers. This
flexibility is not provided by the coordinating transshipment price contract since it leads
to a single split-up of the total expected profit.
The unidirectional transshipment system (Tji = 0) cannot be coordinated at all with
an unit transshipment price contract (see Arikan and Silbermayr (2018)). This is similar to
the setting under a wholesale price contract in a two echelon system with a supplier and a
buyer (e.g. Cachon (2003)) or to the bidirectional transshipment setting of Hu et al. (2007)
with asymmetric parameters between two retailers. Limiting transshipments in only one
direction causes extreme asymmetry in the system. Arikan and Silbermayr (2018) study a
number of simple contracts that coordinate the unidirectional transshipment setting. These
contracts include a combination of transshipment price rij , leftover subsidy τL per unit
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of leftover at the transshipment giver i paid by the transshipment receiving retailer j and
shortage subsidy τS per unit of shortage in j paid by i. Contract types including (rij , τL)
or (rij , τS) can not guarantee that the contract is beneficial for both parties. This problem
is shown to be overcome by designing a contract with three terms (rij , τL, τS) which can
achieve coordination such that both parties are better off compared to a no-transshipment
setting. Such a contract again has the desirable property of flexibility allowing an arbitrary
division of the total expected profit.
3.1.2. n > 2 retailers
So far we have focused on the case of two retailers. Analyzing a transshipment system
with more than two decentralized players is known to be a nontrivial task (Rudi et al.
(2001); Huang and Sošić (2010a); Shao et al. (2011); Arikan and Silbermayr (2018)). In
the case of two retailers it is clear that any leftovers of one retailer are transshipped
to the other retailer facing a stockout. In the n > 2 retailer case, however, if there is
more than one retailer facing a stockout any leftovers have to be allocated according to a
specific allocation rule. In a non-cooperative environment, finding a proper allocation rule
is challenging.
For simplicity and tractability Huang and Sošić (2010a), Shao et al. (2011) and Arikan
and Silbermayr (2018) extend their analytical tractable two-retailer models by numerically
investigating a proportional allocation rule and assume n > 2 symmetric retailers. That is,
a retailer facing a stockout (leftover) receives transshipments (transships excess inventory)
proportional to its excess demand (inventory), if total excess demand (inventory) of all
retailers is higher than their total excess inventory (demand). Arikan and Silbermayr
(2018) show that, for both the bidirectional and unidirectional setting, most of the results
in the two retailer case also hold for the case with n > 2 newsvendors (this is also concluded
by Huang and Sošić (2010a) and Shao et al. (2011) for the bidirectional transshipment
setting). For example, the transshipment price contract can coordinate the symmetric
bidirectional multi-retailer transshipment system. However, similar to the two-retailer
setting, the system with n retailers might not be coordinated via simple unit transshipment
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prices as soon as certain asymmetries are included in the system. In practice, however, there
may be certain asymmetries in the supply chain. Reasons can be differences in retailers’
size and/or proximity to transportation hubs or differences in the retailers’ shortage cost
(Axsäter, 2003; Kranenburg and Van Houtum, 2009). Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012) provide
an example where a hospital and adjacent pharmacy share inventory of medical equipment
or materials, where a shortage of an item means something different at the two locations.
Hanany et al. (2010) develop a transshipment pricing mechanism with a transshipment
fund, that unlike the unit transshipment price contract discussed in Rudi et al. (2001) and
others for the case of 2 retailers, always coordinates the general n-retailer transshipment
problem in a fully non-cooperative setting. Retailers make initial payments to the fund (i.e.
a third party financial entity that contracts with the retailers on transshipment payments)
and after demand realization, transshipped residuals and payments from the fund to the
retailers dependent on the retailers’ announcements about excess supply or demand and
are specified according to a predetermined rule. This mechanism creates a large set of
feasible transshipment payments that coordinate the n-retailer transshipment problem.
Another stream of literature discusses two-stage non-cooperative/cooperative games,
so-called ’biform games’ (Brandenburger and Stuart (2007)), with non-cooperative inven-
tory decisions in the first stage and cooperative shipping decisions in the second stage
termed ’coopetition’ (for a review on cooperative game theory and inventory management
see e.g. Nagarajan and Sošić (2008), Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) and Montrucchio et al.
(2012)). The main difference to the literature discussed before is that although the alloca-
tion mechanism is as-well defined before demand realization the transshipment prices are
set after demand realization (ex post) and are agreed on cooperatively. Anupindi et al.
(2001) analyze a very general framework with n decentralized newsvendors that share all
residual inventories through such a two-stage non-cooperative/cooperative game. They
show that the core of the game is non-empty and that there exists an allocation mecha-
nism in the form of a fractional allocation rule with a side payment scheme that achieves
a coordinated solution for inventory deployment and allocation. The authors, however,
15
         
point out the main difficulty in such allocation problems. That is, while the inventory
decision can be done without any agreement with the other players in the game, for the
allocation decision, in contrast, the players must find a mutual consent. Huang and Sošić
(2010a) compare the performance of the ex ante transshipment price method of Rudi et al.
(2001) and others against the ex post allocation rule of Anupindi et al. (2001) showing
that neither allocation method dominates the other.
Granot and Sošić (2003) extend the model of Anupindi et al. (2001) including the
retailers’ decision of how much residual inventory to share with the other players. They
present a three-stage model, where in the first stage retailers make inventory decision before
demand realization, in the second stage (after demand realization) they decide on how much
residual stock to share and in the third stage, inventories are transshipped and profits
allocated according to an allocation rule. They discuss the impact of different allocation
rules on the retailers willingness to share residual inventory with others in the second
stage and if coordination can be achieved. Yan and Zhao (2015) develop a mechanism to
coordinate n retailers that will completely share their residuals by involving a third party
(e.g. a manufacturer) who subsidizes the transshipment profit allocation.
Huang and Sošić (2010b) compare the single-shot transshipment game of n newsvendors
with a game that is repeated infinitely many times. They show that it could be a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium to share all the residuals at the second stage in the repeated game
if the discount factor is large enough.
3.2. Physical centralization of inventories
Physical aggregation is another common practice of inventory pooling. Instead of
having local inventories for each retailer, inventories are stored at a central storage facility
(warehouse). Usually the storage cost at the centralized facility is lower than the total
storage cost at the retailers. However, physical centralization also increases response time
and transportation cost to customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2016).
The majority of literature dealing with the physical centralization of inventories assume
either a central control (e.g. Eppen, 1979; Chen and Lin, 1989; Gerchak and He, 2003;
16
         
Corbett and Rajaram, 2006) or a cooperative newsvendor game (e.g. Hartman et al.,
2000; Hartman and Dror, 2005). This may be caused by the fact that the physical sharing
of a storage location and consequently a joint stock and ownership can be critical for
independent retailers. Further, one again needs a proper allocation rule for assigning the
joint stock to the retailers.
In practice, however, there do exist situations where the warehouse is the only source for
replenishment in case of a stockout. For independent retailers this is especially appropri-
ate when organizational structures, like franchising arrangements, inhibit transshipments
among retailers (Wee and Dada, 2005).
Although in respect to the design of the network the non-cooperative game with phys-
ical centralization of inventories is different from the game discussed in Section 3.1, math-
ematically they are related to each other regarding existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium (see Silbermayr and Gerchak (2019)). Hence, in this section we briefly discuss
main differences and findings in literature.
In terms of modelling the main differences compared to the setting discussed in Section
3.1 are that i) there is a single per unit purchase cost c at the central storage location for
all retailers, ii) the final allocation of stocks to the retailers or customers may include addi-
tional transportation cost due to the centralization and iii) there might be a compensation
cost for using the other firms contribution to the common stock (Silbermayr and Gerchak,
2019). Now, in a non-cooperative environment each retailer i decides on his contribution
Qi to the joint stock based on uncertain demand Di (Ben-Zvi and Gerchak, 2012). The
retailers make their decisions simultaneously. After demand is realized each retailer i first
receives the minimum of the order Qi and the demand Di. Then, residual stock is allocated
to retailers facing a shortage according to a given allocation rule.
Consider the model of Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012) with two independent firms differing
in their shortage cost. If a retailer faces a stockout situation, then he will receive an
allocation proportional to its contribution, i.e. Qi/(Qi+Qj). Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012)
provide first order conditions of such a model and prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash
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equilibrium. Gerchak (2016) analyze the consequences of such a non-cooperative game with
a modified scheme that is beneficial to all parties relative to a no-pooling situation. Ben-
Zvi and Gerchak (2012) and Gerchak (2016) assume that it is costless for retailer i to use
residual stock from j’s contribution to the joint stock Qj .
Netessine and Rudi (2006) study the practice of drop-shipping for multiple decentral-
ized newsvendors and a wholesaler as a non-cooperative game. They analyze a combined
strategy where retailers use own inventories and drop-shipping stocked at a central location
owned by the wholesaler. The difference to the literature discussed before is that central-
ized inventory decision is done by another independent player at an upstream echelon
and not by the independent retailers. They discuss structural properties of the equilib-
rium solution and show that such a combined strategy often benefits retailers as well as
wholesaler.
Silbermayr and Gerchak (2019) address horizontal coordination in a model with two in-
dependent retailers that might partially pool their inventories. Each retailer decides on the
quantity stocked at its local storage facility and on its contribution to the joint warehouse.
They assume a non-negative compensation cost for using the other firms contribution to
the pool. Transshipments between the retailers are prohibitively expensive. They show
that, similar to the transshipment setting with a transshipment price contract, a system
with physical centralization of inventories can be coordinated if retailers appropriately set
a compensation cost for using the other retailers’ residual stock at the warehouse.
The general framework of Anupindi et al. (2001) with n newsvendors constituting a
biform game with an ex post inventory allocation rule also considers physical centralization
at one or several jointly owned warehouses in addition to transshipments between retailers.
They introduce the notion of ’claims’ that establish ownership for each unit of inventory
in the system, regardless of its locations. After demand is realized the claim holder owns
the right to determine how its purchased units are to be used. This reduces the inventory
decision (at the first stage of the biform game) to a non-cooperative game in spite of the
presence of common inventory in central warehouses with joint ownership. That is, with
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’claims’ the ex post allocation rule allows for horizontal coordination also under physical
centralization of inventories.
A summary of literature on horizontal contracts that coordinate a system of indepen-
dent retailers that physically or virtually pool their inventories is given in Table 2. We
report whether the contract has been studied analytically for the 2 or n retailer case and
whether it has the flexibility to arbitrarily divide the total profit between the retailers.
Horizontal Inventory No. Flexible Paper
contract type interaction retailers profit div.
Transshipment price Transsh. 2 no Rudi et al. (2001), Hu et al. (2007),
(ex ante) Huang and Sošić (2010a), Shao et al. (2011),
Lee and Park (2016), Arikan and Silbermayr (2018)
Compensation cost for Physical cent. 2 no Silbermayr and Gerchak (2019)
using centralized stock
Implicit transsh. price Transsh. 2 yes Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010)
depend. on inventory dec.
Combining transsh. price, Unid.-transsh. 2 yes Arikan and Silbermayr (2018)
leftover & shortage subsidy
Transshipment fund Transsh. n yes Hanany et al. (2010)
arranged by third party
Ex post allocation rule Transsh. n yes Anupindi et al. (2001), Granot and Sošić (2003),
(biform game) (Physical cent.) Huang and Sošić (2010a),
Huang and Sošić (2010b), Yan and Zhao (2015)
Table 2: Overview for literature on horizontal contracts between retailers.
4. Customer driven interaction
In this section we consider non-cooperative newsvendor games that arise from distinct
customer driven interactions, whereby the sales of one product affects the sales of another
product. First, there is product substitution where an unsatisfied customer is willing to
buy a substitute product at another retailer, i.e. a system with competition between the
newsvendors (Section 4.1). Then, there is product complementarity where an unsatisfied
customers of one product hinders the sales of a complementary product (Section 4.2). The
detailed classification of the literature discussed in this section is shown in Table 4.
4.1. Substitution
The general setting is based on n competing retailers selling substitutable products. As
in the classical newsvendor model, at the beginning of the selling period each newsvendor
decides about own stocking quantity in advance of demand realization. If the demand
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for i’th newsvendor turns out to be larger than its stocking quantity, Di > Qi, then a
customer might be willing to search and buy the product at the other retailers. If the
customer cannot find the product at retailer j he can continue searching in other retail
locations (e.g. Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001)) or he stops and his demand remains
unsatisfied. In the following we discuss the latter setting where the search is over after
one attempt. The search is generally modelled such that a proportion aij of customers
demanding a product at newsvendor i will take product at newsvendor j as substitute.
Modelling the proportion of the unsatisfied demand of i switching to j by 0 < aij ≤ 1 is
general enough to model partial substitution, full substitution and one-way substitution of
demand. For an overview we refer to Turken et al. (2012). Under partial substitution only
a fraction of demands will switch to a competitor, i.e. 0 < aij < 1. Full substitution means
that all customers of i are willing to accept the product j when retailer i is out of stock, i.e.
aij = 1. Finally, one-way substitution expresses a system where, for example, customer i
will switch to j with probability aij in case of a stockout but not vice versa, i.e. 0 < aij ≤ 1
and aji = 0. This can be the case if the product of j has a higher quality than the product of
i. One might additionally need an adjustment cost whenever the lower quality product will
be substituted by the higher quality product (Deflem and Van Nieuwenhuyse, 2013). Note
that one-way substitution can also be related to unidirectional transshipments discussed
in Section 3.1.
One of the earliest works under this setting is Parlar (1988) which considers only
two competing newsvendors, but highlights that in practice substitution often takes place
between different products sold by independent retailers. Wang and Parlar (1994) extend
the work of Parlar (1988) to three competing newsvendors. Li and Ha (2008) extend the
two retailer case selling substitutable products including reactive capacity to fill uncertain
demand in addition to initial inventory. They show that additional reactive capacity has
a positive competitive effect on a retailer but a negative effect on the competitor. Wu
et al. (2019) explore the two competing retailer case with asymmetric bargaining power of
the retailers where the weak retailer is capital-constrained and takes a trade credit with
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a wholesale price dictated by the manufacturer. The trade credit can be used by the
manufacturer as a strategic response to the bargaining power of the other retailer.
Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001), Netessine and Rudi (2003) and Huang et al. (2011),
for example, study the problem for any number of newsvendors. Lippman and McCardle
(1997) study n competing newsvendors with a probabilistic aggregate industry demand
that is allocated across firms by a predefined rule (e.g. deterministic or random splitting).
Cachon (2003) studies supplier retailer coordination with n competing retailers where
stochastic industry demand is divided proportional to the retailers’ inventory levels.
For the general model with n retailer facing random demands Di, i = 1, ..., n and
substitution, the effective demand is Dei = Di +
∑
i 6=j aji(Dj −Qj)+ while the net demand
does not play a role in this customer search setting.
There are slight differences in the literature with respect to modelling the total shortage
cost. A limiting case would be a newsvendor with emergency orders. Some (e.g. Netessine
and Rudi (2003)) do not consider any shortage costs. Parlar (1988), Wang and Parlar
(1994) and Qi et al. (2015), for example, assume that the shortage cost is only incurred for
the unsatisfied demand from initial customers, i.e. retailer i incurs a total shortage cost of
pi(Di−Qi)+. On the other hand, Lippman and McCardle (1997) and Huang et al. (2011)
assume a shortage cost for all the unsatisfied demand both from initial and secondary
customers, i.e. retailer i incurs a total shortage cost of pi(Dei − Qi)+. In the latter case,
the expected profit of retailer i is
Πi = E(ri min(D
e
i , Qi)− ciQi + si(Qi −Dei )+ − pi(Dei −Qi)+). (8)
If the shortage cost is only incurred for the unsatisfied demand from initial customers then
the last term in Equation (8) has to be replaced by pi(Di −Qi)+.
Equilibrium analysis
From the modelling perspective the advantage of considering shortage cost pi(Dei−Qi)+
is the fact that expected profit Πi only includes Dei as the random component while the
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other one has bothDei andDi. As a result, the first model gives a more compact formulation
of the optimality condition. The optimal order quantity Q∗i satisfies
Pr(Dei < Q
∗
i ) = FDei (Q
∗
i ) =
ri − ci + pi
ri − si + pi . (9)
Hence, the critical ratio of retailer i under substitution is equal to the critical ratio of the
classical newsvendor in Equation (2), but the demand distribution is different.
Πi is concave in Qi and the slope of the best response function is
∂Qi
∂Qj
= −aji
gDei (Qi)
fDei (Qi)
. (10)
Since fDei (Qi) ≥ gDei (Qi), the slope is non-positive and smaller than one in absolute terms.
On the other hand, under the model with shortage cost pi(Di − Qi)+ the optimality
condition is
ri(1− FDei (Q∗i ))− pi(1− FDi(Q∗i )) + siFDei (Q∗i )− ci = 0 (11)
and the slope of the best response function is
∂Qi
∂Qj
= −aji
(ri − si)gDei (Qi)
(ri − si)fDei (Qi) + pifDi(Qi)
. (12)
Similarly, the slope is non-positive and smaller than one in absolute terms.
Concavity of Πi guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium under both models. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium is again proven using the contraction mapping argument. In
order to show that the mapping is a contraction it is sufficient to show that no column or
row sum of matrix J exceeds one, where J is the Jacobian of the best response mapping.
Under both models, | ∂Qi∂Qj | < aji, and the following holds for all columns i:
∑
j=1,..,n
|∂Qi
∂Qj
|<
∑
j=1,..,n
aji. (13)
Note that the same holds for the row sums.
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Therefore, if either
∑
j=1,..,n aji < 1 for all i or
∑
i=1,..,n aji < 1 for all j, then there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Horizontal coordination
In the centralized case, when all products/locations are managed by a single decision
maker, the total expected profit with shortage cost pi(Dei −Qi)+ is
ΠC = E(
n∑
i=1
ri min(D
e
i , Qi)− ciQi + si(Qi −Dei )+ − pi(Dei −Qi)+). (14)
Equation (14) is concave for n = 2 (see Parlar and Goyal (1984)) and n = 3 and partial
substitution (see Ernst and Kouvelis (1999)). Netessine and Rudi (2003), however, show
that the profit function might not be concave and not even quasiconcave in a setting with
n > 2 retailers and full substitution considering the analytically tractable deterministic
analog of Equation (14) and numerical experiments. Hence, the first order condition does
not guarantee the global optimum in such settings. Their numerical experiments, however,
indicate that for reasonable demands where the coefficient of variation is more than 0.1
the objective function is concave in Qi for i = 1, ...n.
The first order necessary optimality conditions for i = 1, ..., n are given by
Pr(Dei < Qi)− Pr(Di < Qi < Dei ) +
∑
i 6=j
rj − sj + pj
ri − si + pi aijPr(D
e
j < Qj , Di > Qi)
−ri − ci + pi
ri − si + pi = 0. (15)
If the other approach with shortage cost pi(Di−Qi)+ is taken the first order conditions
are given by
Pr(Dei < Qi)− Pr(Di < Qi < Dei ) +
∑
i 6=j
rj − sj
ri − si aijPr(D
e
j < Qj , Di > Qi)
+
pi
ri − siPr(Di < Qi)−
ri − ci + pi
ri − si = 0. (16)
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Comparing the first order conditions under centralized control (Equations (15) and
(16)) with those under decentralized control (Equations (9) and (11)), respectively, it
can be concluded that the system is suboptimal in the competitive newsvendor case with
product/demand substitution (e.g. Netessine and Rudi (2003) and Huang et al. (2011)).
Compared to the centralized case, in competition each retailer receives less expected profit.
That is, competition among retailers introduces challenges for supply chain coordination
(Cachon, 2003).
Lippman and McCardle (1997) find that competition makes the retailers order more in
anticipation of overflow demand from the competitors who may stockout. This effect is also
noticed by e.g. Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001) and Cachon (2003). Netessine and Rudi
(2003) show that although competition compared to centralized control usually leads to
overstocking, there are also some cases with the counterintuitive situation that competition
leads to understocking. Qi et al. (2015) who consider a two-echelon framework with one
manufacturer and two retailers show that the total stock of two competing newsvendors is
decreasing in the (endogenous) wholesale price and that competition may result in lower
total supply chain efficiency compared to a centralized system.
As already discussed in Section 2 the customer driven interaction is an external factor
and no literature on horizontal contract design exist in this setting. Coordination under
substitution is only addressed through vertical contracts with manufacturer-retailer compe-
tition, as for example in Boyaci (2005) who studies a multiple-channel distribution system
in which a manufacturer sells its product through an independent retailer and its wholly-
owned channel with customer spill-over. While simple vertical contracts fail to coordinate
such a system, they show that a penalty contract and a two-part compensation-commission
contract under which the retailer earns revenues only as commissions on his channel sales
that exceed a flexible target can coordinate the supply chain.
4.2. Complementarity
Unlike product substitution where an unsatisfied customer chooses to buy a substitute
product which benefits the seller of the substitute, the existence of cross-selling or com-
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plementarity may produce opposite effects (Zhang et al., 2014). Complementarity implies
that customers are willing to purchase some related products together with the original
and if one of the products is out of stock the related product is no longer demanded. Es-
pecially for electronic products sold by independent companies the complementarity may
be an issue. Netessine and Zhang (2005) give a few examples such as, e.g., music players
whose sales are impacted by the availability of compatible rerecorded discs.
The topic has been mainly studied in areas such as e.g. customer behavior or marketing.
Within the newsvendor framework, however, it has been rarely studied. In particular, we
only came across Netessine and Zhang (2005) and Zhang et al. (2014) that deal with
cross-selling/complementarity in non-cooperative newsvendor problems.
Let aij be the decreased demand for item i caused by a stock out situation of item
j, then the expected profit of a newsvendor with cross-selling is obtained by replacing
the effective demand Dei in the expected profit functions defined in Section 4.1 by the
net demand Dni = Di −
∑
i 6=j aji(Dj − Qj)+. Hence, cross-selling is complementary to
substitution where a newsvendor has to consider the effective demand when making the
inventory decision. Note that Netessine and Zhang (2005) describe the net demand for i
as Dni = Di −
∑
i 6=j aji(Dj − Qj)+ +
∑
i 6=j ajiDj , where aij is the fraction of customers
willing to purchase from retailer i will also purchase from retailer j but only if retailer i
has the product on stock.
Similar to the substitution setting, the optimal order quantity Q∗i (Qj) under comple-
mentarity and shortage cost pi(Dni −Qi)+ satisfies
Pr(Dni < Q
∗
i ) = FDni (Q
∗
i ) =
ri − ci + pi
ri − si + pi . (17)
The critical ratio of retailer i under complementarity again is equal to the critical ratio
of the classical newsvendor in Equation (2), but the demand Di is replaced by the net
demand Dni .
Again a unique Nash equilibrium for the game exists if
∑
j=1,..,n aji < 1 for all i or
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∑
i=1,..,n aji < 1 for all j (Zhang et al., 2014).
Assuming a centralized decision maker under complementarity a unique solution is
guaranteed (Netessine and Zhang, 2005; Zhang et al., 2014), while under substitution this
is not the case (see discussion in Section 4.1). Comparing the first order conditions of
the centralized and decentralized system it can again be concluded that the system with
independent players is not coordinated. Netessine and Zhang (2005) and Zhang et al.
(2014) show that decentralization in such a setting leads to understocking. Netessine and
Zhang (2005) also discuss the intuitive result that the expected profits in the decentralized
case are lower than in the centralized case, while the numerical results of Zhang et al.
(2014) show that in some cases the opposite is true, i.e. more sales do not mean higher
profits under complementarity.
Netessine and Zhang (2005) also discuss the implication of complementarity on a two-
echelon supply chain including the manufacturer’s decision. They conclude that competi-
tion on complements induces both retailers and the wholesaler to coordinate the supply
chain.
5. Combination or comparison of designed and customer driven interactions
There exist some work that deal with the i) combination of or ii) comparison be-
tween the different settings of non-cooperative games with horizontal inventory interac-
tions. Anupindi and Bassok (1999) study a decentralized two-echelon supply chain with
one manufacturer and two retailers and partial substitution. They discuss the impact of the
retailers designed operations, in particular centralization of stocks at a warehouse versus
decentralized stocks at the retail level, on the supply chain when a fraction α of customers
who do not find the good at their retailer attempt to buy the good at the other retailer.
In the system with centralization of stocks they assume a single decision maker (central
control). This assumption implies that centralization of stocks is always more beneficial for
the retailers. However, looking at the total supply chain profit including the manufacturers
profit they show that it may not always increase upon centralization of stocks by retailers
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as for certain α the expected sales in the decentralized system with substitution is larger.
Çömez et al. (2012) study decentralized retailers with customer over-spills and transship-
ments. They assume that transshipments do not occur after all demands are realized, but
a transshipment request is sent after each customer arrival at a stock-out retailer. The
other retailer has the flexibility to reject or accept each request individually. They show
that the optimal transshipment policy is characterized by the inventory holdback levels.
Zou et al. (2010) compare two alternative scenarios of a system with two retailers and
a common manufacturer: one with transshipments and another without transshipments
but substitution. They discuss the impact of the customer switching rate and the trans-
shipment price on the benefit of transshipments compared to a scenario with substitution.
Chen et al. (2016) also compare the two scenarios but they additionally include a customer’s
willingness to wait in case the product is not available and the possibility to arrange a fast-
shipment directly to the customer from the supplier arranged by the stocked out retailer.
They find that when fast-ship participation rate in the substitution scenario is high, the
supplier tends to prefer the retailers to transship, while the retailers prefer substitution.
Li and Li (2018) study a decentralized supply chain with one manufacturer and two sym-
metric retailers comparing transshipments with substitution, i.e. without transshipments
a fraction of unsatisfied customers buy the product at the competing retailer. They show
that as long as the transshipment price is properly chosen the retailers will always prefer
transshipments independent of the proportion of customers switching to the competitor.
They also study how the power structure of the supply chain members affects the trans-
shipment decision. If the manufacturer has power to control transshipment prices he will
choose transshipments over substitution and set a high transshipment price which increases
the retailers inventories. If the manufacturer can only decide whether to transship or not,
then he will avoid transshipment if the customer search probability is high.
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6. Summary and future research directions
6.1. Summary
In practice retailers are often independent players in the supply chain. Due to risk
pooling or customer interactions between independent retailers the inventory decision of
one retailer may affect the decision of another. Hence, non-cooperative game theory is a
tool that can be applied in this context. This paper provides an overview of the specific
settings where non-cooperative static game theory with horizontal inventory interactions
among newsvendors can be applied and discusses findings in the literature. Thereby, we
distinguish between inventory interactions that are caused i) through the design of the
retail-networks, i.e. local storage with inventory sharing through transshipments or inven-
tory sharing through physical centralization of inventories and ii) through the customer
driven interactions whereby retailers sell substitutable or complementary products. For
each specific setting we discuss the conditions required for the existence and uniqueness of
a Nash equilibrium in such a non-cooperative game. Further, we analyze the differences
and relations between the different settings and discuss the main findings in the literature.
We also compare the decentralized systems to a centrally controlled systems in order to
emphasize the impact of horizontal coordination and horizontal contracting in such games.
To summarize, in this survey we review the contributions to date for the practical set-
tings of horizontal inventory interactions between independent newsvendors and also give
a comparison with a system of a single decision maker. From the managerial perspective,
the reviewed mathematical models and their solutions provide important insights for in-
ventory managers into the horizontal interactions in decentralized retailer networks. The
findings provide guidance for both practice and future research how retailers considering
the impact of these interactions can improve supply chain performance. The presented
models can serve as building blocks for topics that have not been addressed so far and
deserve further investigation.
28
         
6.2. Future research directions
The findings of this review of the literature on non-cooperative newsvendor games with
horizontal inventory interactions open various promising future research directions.
1. Combining vertical and horizontal relationships in the supply chain: Although some
work already discusses the vertical relationships, e.g. with a supplier or a manufac-
turer, in addition to the horizontal relationships we have focused on, there is still a
lack of fully understanding how the vertical relations impact the supply chain perfor-
mance under inventory pooling and competition, respectively. There is also potential
in comparing all the individual settings discussed here in order to get a better under-
standing under which particular scenario a focus should either be put on the designed
interaction or the customer driven interaction in a system with decentralized retailers.
2. Horizontal contracting: There is also a lot of potential in searching for more horizon-
tal contracts that coordinate the supply chain, since most of the contracts that have
been addressed so far are either not always coordinating or they are very complex and
difficult to implement in practice. One has to find simple contracts that are flexible
in allocating the total profits arbitrarily between the independent newsvendors. Con-
sider the simple ex ante transshipment price contract that might not coordinate the
decentralized transshipment system as soon as certain asymmetries among retailers
arise (Hu et al., 2007). This is due to the implied unbalanced risk sharing between
the retailers whenever they are asymmetric. For example, the retailers could add
another payment, e.g. on leftovers or stockouts, in addition to the transshipment
price in order to balance the risk between them (see also Arikan and Silbermayr
(2018)). This would also lead to more flexibility as the introduction of another price
also allows to arbitrarily divide the total expected profit between the retailers.
3. Omni-channel supply chains and off-price retailers: The settings reviewed here are
also relevant in today’s omni-channel supply chains that include online-shops and/or
different costumer segments where the non-cooperative game-theoretic framework
can be applied (see e.g. Seifert et al. (2006) and Zhao et al. (2016)). Online and
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oﬄine retailers need to compete in new and innovative ways (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2013). In addition to e-commerce, off-price retailers such as T.J. Maxx and Ross
have seen their market share increase greatly in the last three decades (Khouja et al.,
2018). Regular retailers are transshipping leftover inventory to off-price retailers
offering the retailers a useful sale channel. Off-price retailers offer these products
at considerable price discounts, which puts them into a unique competitive position
(Hess and Ring, 2014). It would be interesting to model such settings as a non-
cooperative newsvendor game. To summarize, using the existing concepts reviewed
here and apply them to the nowadays challenging supply chain structures of omni-
channel retailing and/or the presence of off-price retailers in order to provide decision
support is a promising research field.
4. New technologies and data driven processes: Recent technology advances are creating
new business models presenting new challenges to retailers. For example, smart
phones enable tracking of customers and also remove barriers from retailers such
as geography and customer ignorance (Brynjolfsson et al., 2013). Large amounts
of valuable data from e.g. social, mobile or local channels provide potential for
better understanding customer interactions and effectively control inventory levels.
However, they are also creating a new competitive environment for retailers. Hence,
retailers that are able to analyze these new data can gain competitive advantage
in the new business environment (Zhan and Tan, 2018). It would be interesting to
integrate big data from internal and external sources into the existing models to
generate new business models for retailers in competitive environments. Choi et al.
(2018) discuss how different types of big data techniques can be applied in modern
operations management. From the inventory related side new technologies such as
e.g. 3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing, with its built to order fashion
also lead to new challenges (Chen et al., 2017). Retailers will have to rethink their
traditional approaches with this new technology; however, it could also lead to new
ways of horizontal collaboration between independent retailers if they are willing to
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share these new technological resources or raw materials.
5. Sustainability of horizontal inventory interaction: When looking at the designed
operations, inventory pooling is known to be a best practice from the economic
perspective, however its consequence on the environment and the impact on the
product carbon footprint of the product should also be taken into consideration
(Silbermayr et al., 2017). It is well-known that inventory pooling leads to higher
expected profits than no pooling. However, the consequences on the environmental
sustainability of such horizontal interactions for independent players has not been
analyzed yet.
6. Rules for inventory allocations: Especially in networks with multiple (more than
two) retailers, understanding how to design and negotiate proper allocation rules for
assigning residual inventory or demand to the individual retailers has to be advanced.
While there is some work on allocation mechanisms, the relevant factors that influence
the performance of the mechanism, and the problem of putting the right incentives to
the retailers in order to engage in horizontal interactions deserve future exploration.
This is especially relevant in the case of physical pooling, where there are additional
issues in sharing joint warehouses in a decentralized manner. Empirical investigations
could help in order to better understand the main challenges and extend the theory
in such settings.
7. Newsvendors with alternative optimization objectives: Previous work on the newsven-
dor problem has mainly focused on analytical approaches assuming risk neutral ex-
pected profit maximizing decision makers (Wang et al., 2012). The findings of this
review of the literature are all based on maximizing the expected profits. There exist
some work in the setting with independent risk-averse or loss-averse retailers selling
substitutable products (e.g. Wu et al., 2014, Wang, 2010, Liu et al., 2013, Shen et al.,
2016). Future research could focus on using alternative risk preferences rather than
risk neutrality to describe risk behavior under both designed and customer driven in-
ventory interactions. This would change the (equilibrium) inventory quantities under
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decentralized and centralized supply chains depending on the retailers’ risk attitudes.
However, still very little is known about actual risk attitudes of the newsvendors in
a decentralized setting.
8. Behavioral newsvendors: The success of the existing operations management tools
reviewed in this paper and the accuracy of its theory rely heavily on understanding
human behaviour (Bendoly et al., 2006). There is a great potential in studying the
human factor in an environment with independent players that optimize their own
objectives in order to understand decision makers’ attitudes and extend the standard
theory on non-cooperative newsvendor games. Ovchinnikov et al. (2015) is the first
study that analyzes the human factor through an laboratory experiment for the set-
ting with two newsvendors selling substitutable products. Their experimental result
shows that on the aggregate level the participants did not respond to the other play-
ers actions. This was also shown in Zhao and Zhao (2016), Feng and Zhang (2017),
Kirshner and Ovchinnikov (2018), Villa and Castañeda (2018) and Quiroga et al.
(2019). The use of human experiments can help to relate the empirical findings to
the analytical tools discussed here and extend them by including behavioral factors.
Since studying the behavioral aspects in decentralized supply chains is just at its
beginning it would be very interesting to further explore the human factor whenever
horizontal interaction in a decentralized environment appear in order to integrate
the experimental observations into the existing tools. Thereby, one has to analyze
the aggregate and also the individual level outcomes of the experiments. Note that,
for example, a newsvendor with per unit penalty cost discussed here has been de-
fined in the seminal work of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) as a newsvendor with
stockout-averse preferences. Ho et al. (2010) and Kirshner and Ovchinnikov (2018),
for example, show by means of experiments that the psychological aversion to left-
overs is greater than the disutility for stockouts. Therefore, it would be interesting
to study this further by extending the centralized multi-retailer inventory model of
Ho et al. (2010) to a setting with decentralized retailers. This is an important re-
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search direction and might lead to some additional models and tools that can assist
in designing and negotiating such interactions in practice.
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No. dec. Non-ident. Transsh. Physical Comp. to Coord. Incl. Specifics
newsv. newsv. Pooling central con. mechanism upstream dec.
Anupindi et al. (2001) n
√ √ √ √
B
Rudi et al. (2001) 2
√ √ √
T
Granot and Sošić (2003) n
√ √ √
B
Netessine and Rudi (2006) n
√ √ √
drop-shipping
Hu et al. (2007) 2
√ √ √
T uncertain supplier capacity
Hanany et al. (2010) n
√ √ √
F
Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010) 2
√ √ √
I
Huang and Sošić (2010a) n
√ √ √
T, B
Huang and Sošić (2010b) n
√ √ √
B repeated game
Shao et al. (2011) 2
√ √
T
√
Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012) 2
√ √ √
Yan and Zhao (2015) n
√ √ √
B
Gerchak (2016) 2
√
Lee and Park (2016) 2
√ √ √
T uncertain supplier capacity (rationing game)
Arikan and Silbermayr (2018) 2
√ √ √
T+S+L unidirectional transshipments
Feng et al. (2018) 2
√ √ √
T partial backordering
Silbermayr and Gerchak (2019) 2
√ √ √
C partial pooling
Coordination mechanism: T: transshipment price (ex ante), B: biform (non-cooperative/cooperative) game,
I: implicit pricing, F: transshipment fund, S: shortage subsidy, L: leftover subsidy, C: compensation cost
Table 3: Overview for the literature on designed horizontal interactions.
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No. dec. Non-ident. Substitutes Complements Comp. to Incl. Specifics
newsv. newsv. central con. upstream dec.
Parlar (1988) 2
√ √ √
Wang and Parlar (1994) 3
√ √ √
Lippman and McCardle (1997) n
√
splitting rule for industry demand allocation
Mahajan and Van Ryzin (2001) n
√ √ √
dynamic consumer choice
Cachon (2003) n
√ √ √
industry demand allocated propor. to inventory
Netessine and Rudi (2003) n
√ √ √
Netessine and Zhang (2005) n
√ √ √ √ √
complements vs. substitutes
Li and Ha (2008) 2
√ √
reactive capacity
Huang et al. (2011) n
√ √ √
Zhang et al. (2014) 2
√ √ √
Qi et al. (2015) n
√ √ √ √
Wu et al. (2019) 2
√ √ √ √
dominant and weak (capital-contained) retailer
Anupindi and Bassok (1999) 2
√ √ √
physical pooling vs. decentralized stocks
Zou et al. (2010) 2
√ √
substitution vs. transshipments
Çömez et al. (2012) 2
√ √
transshipment request after each customer arrival
Chen et al. (2016) 2
√ √ √ √
transshipments vs. substitution (incl. fast-ship option)
Li and Li (2018) 2
√ √
transshipments vs. substitution
Table 4: Overview for the literature on customer driven interactions and on combination/comparison of designed and customer driven interaction.
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